




Some Words about Problems of “Uncontroversial Crimea”
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Consequences of the Russian-Georgian conflict and the recognition, by the Russian Federation, of the South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence that threatens the territorial integrity of Georgia, incorporate not only 
the absence of a consolidated policy of Ukrainian politicians on this issue. Actions of Russia on the post-Soviet 
space in the zone of frozen conflicts in the Caucasus urged to look for new opportunities to legitimate power 
of separatists in Trans-Dniestria, including relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning the Nagorny 
Karabakh. Yet inside and outside Ukraine, this has become another pretext to renew rhetoric on the further 
geo-political future of the ARC and protection of rights of the Russian community in the Ukrainian autonomy. 
Despite the aforementioned, in his interview to the German ARD TV Company on August 30, 2008, Russian 
Prime Minister V. Putin denied that Crimea is Russia’s next goal and said “Crimea is not a controversial terri-
tory”.
“Unlike the conflict between the South Ossetia and Georgia, there was not any ethnic conflict in Crimea. There, 
inside Crimean society, complex processes are going on. There, there are problems of the Crimean Tatars, 
Ukrainian population and Russian population, Slavic population at least. Though it is a problem of Ukraine’s 
domestic policy,” he added. 
 
At the same time, it is difficult not to hear other statements of Russian Representative to NATO D. Rogozin, 
who stated about the possible protection of Russian citizens in Crimea and said, “We will ensure security of 
our citizens wherever they live, either among polar bears or in Africa or even in the USA. It is a constitutional 
obligation of our leadership to ensure life and human dignity of Russian citizens.” It is difficult to say how many 
citizens of Ukraine have Russian passports in the ARC. Different figures are mentioned but hypothetically, it is 
possible to imagine that this region could potentially be used to increase tension in Ukraine from outside. By 
no means referring to Crimean residents, the ethnic Russians, as a kind of the “5th column” in Ukraine, it can 
be assumed that some politicians and political movements can easily manipulate their natural interests.
 
The issue of a threat of pro-Russian separatism in Crimea is a popular topic. One of the reasons for discus-
sions of this kind is the emergence of many pro-Russian radical organizations that declare total rejection of all 
Ukrainian and sometimes set themselves the annexation of Crimea to the RF as an object. Despite the fact that 
most of them are not numerous and can involve, at least several hundreds of persons in their actions, activity 
of such organizations is broadly covered in the media and creates a respective background in the information 
space of Ukraine and Russia. As before, old pro-Russian organizations and socio-political movements set up 
after the disintegration of the USSR are active. Yet they have mostly integrated into Ukrainian and Crimean 
politics and do not often allow making open separatist statements.
 
One of Crimea’s specific features in the political dimension is the fact that socio-political relations here are 
often determined not only by political competition among various regional political elites and their search of 
tools of influence on economic processes in the autonomy but also by the ethno-political and ethno-religious 
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situation, which has certain impact on socio-political issues acute for the ARC.
 
Some Crimean pro-Russian organizations take an active part in political struggle inside Ukraine, while others 
are “milling the wind” on moot points in Ukrainian-Russian relations and execute orders, often trying not to 
conceal that their activities are funded by the Russian Federation. As a rule, the latter actively oppose Ukraine’s 
accession to NATO and withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) from Crimea. 
 
It can be assumed that Crimean pro-Russian organizations will liven up their activities in the future, when 
it is necessary for respective power institutions and forces in Ukraine. For instance, steps on Ukraine’s path 
to integration into European structures are attended with more active actions of respective organizations on 
the peninsula. And the radical nature of actions of pro-Russian organizations enhances as the date of the 
withdrawal of the Russian BSF from Crimea in 2017 approaches. By inciting anti-NATO sentiments in Crimea, 
certain Russian forces attempt to create a situation of controlled chaos. Meanwhile, it has to be mentioned that 
political pro-Russian organizations of Crimea are uncoordinated and not numerous as before and, therefore, 
cannot produce strong impact on political processes in Ukraine.
 
Except for the current unsteady elements of the situation in the autonomy compared to other Ukrainian re-
gions, there are its own specific problems determining the social development and political situation on the 
whole. These include the coordination of relations between national and regional authorities in promoting 
certain policies, peculiarities of Crimea’s socio-economic development, ethno-political relations, risk of the 
socio-political instability and need to neutralize influence of foreign political factors on the internal situation in 
the ARC.
 
In general, ethno-political relations in the autonomy are determined by the interaction of the three largest eth-
nic groups of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians and Russians. The ARC is the o¬nly administrative and 
territorial formation in a unitary Ukraine, where, by force of some historical circumstances and reasons, the 
ethnic Russians make up the majority of population. Under the 2001 National Census, their share amounts to 
58.5% of Crimean residents. The share of the ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea was 24.4%. As a result of the mass 
return of the Crimean Tatars, their share in the total number of population reached 12.5%.
 
Unmet socio-economic, socio-cultural and political challenges of the Crimean Tatar community remain a major 
conflict factor of the ethno-political situation. A considerable part of conflict factors in Crimea is caused by a 
complex of reasons, among which there are numerous stereotypes against the Crimean Tatar community avail-
able in the consciousness of the Slavic majority of the Crimean population. Conflicts also sporadically emerge 
on political grounds and because of the generally unfavorable economic environment in Crimea. Impact of the 
above factors on the state of interethnic relations and the socio-political situation in the autonomy is growing 
in view of the existent “purpose anti-Tatar and Islamophobic information campaign”. 
 
By the way, different sociological studies prove that on the 16th year of the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars, 
the level of separation of the Ukrainians from this ethnic community is still high, which causes a disinclination 
to see these minority members among citizens of Ukraine though their stay on its territory as guests is admis-
sible.
 
Prejudices and negative stereotypes against the Crimean Tatars ingrained in the mass consciousness of Cri-
mea’s population are effectively used by some Crimean politicians, who demonstrate ability to strategically 
build their political images on such a dangerous ground, gain electoral support, mobilize voters and, in the 
long run, get tools of satisfying interests of those financial and economic forces that strive to control resources, 
including land, in this region.
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Meanwhile, national authorities need to consider cultural specificity of Crimea in their policies and not to ap-
prove decisions that are rather negatively interpreted in the autonomy and, thereby, aggravate prejudices 
against Ukraine. 
 
Another consequence of the absence of a shared vision of the ethno-political future of the autonomy in Ukraine 
includes facts of the disregard of the available ethno-political challenges, while formulating certain tasks and 
decisions. Specifically, in the Government Program for the Socio-Economic Development of the ARC until 2017, 
only 3 out of 16 tasks are dedicated to solving issues related to the ethno-political sphere, which, in the Pro-
gram’s context, concerns exclusively areas of culture and education: to hold “passportization”; preserve and 
restore cultural and historical monuments of national and local concern; develop the cultural sphere of the re-
gion; maintain and enhance the available material and technical basis  of cultural establishments; ensure gov-
ernment support to the development of Ukrainian and promote activities of ethno-cultural societies; carry out 
works on the restoration, museumification and renovation of units of cultural heritage; ensure the execution of 
the right to study in minority languages; and create adequate conditions of the education process by means 
of constructing secondary and pre-school education institutions. However, any concept of the ethno-political 
development has to consider dynamics of ethno-cultural changes in society and set priorities of government 
policy according to ethnic and cultural specificity of a certain ethnic community!
 
At the same time, an actual failure to perform some tasks of national authorities in the areas of regulating 
land relations and developing ethno-political legislation concerning the satisfaction of minority needs evidences 
the lack of coordination and interaction inside the vertical of power and unsatisfactory cooperation with local 
self-government bodies because the desired effects are not always produced. This could be explained by the 
absence of regular, not sporadic, coordination of actions of authorities in the process of setting objectives or 
implementing policies and improper budget funding for specific activities on the part of national authorities 
(the lack of resources). There are more than enough presidential decrees and government resolutions on 
Crimean problems but almost all of them are not applied and local authorities are not an exception to this rule. 
Among other things, these documents deal with the land, language and education issues. Specifically, local 
authorities voiced dissatisfaction with presidential initiatives in the humanitarian, information and education 
areas actually ignored them. 
 
For example, at the July 2, 2008 session of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC, Deputy Speaker 
of the Crimean VR M. Bakharev commented the order of Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine I. Vakar-
chuk on the broader use of Ukrainian at schools offering tuition in minority languages and called Head of the 
Council of Ministers of the ARC V. Plakida to oblige the Ministry of Education and Science of the ARC not to 
execute orders of the senior Ministry! And First Deputy Speaker of the Crimean VR and leader of the Russian 
Community of Crimea S. Tsekov stated that should the policy for Crimea’s ukrainization pursued by the Ministry 
of Education and Science of Ukraine be continued, he would personally, notwithstanding of his office of state 
official, call the autonomy’s residents to resolute protest actions. 
 
Relations between the center and political leadership of the ARC are generally characterized with weak central 
power in pursuing government policy in the region, which indicates the low level of the implementation of Kyiv 
decisions on the autonomy. The low effectiveness of cooperation is explained, to a large extent, by tactical 
assignments of political positioning of the presidential entourage. It is indisputably influenced by other proc-
esses in Kyiv, i.e. ambiguous relations of BYuT and OUPSD inside the parliamentary coalition and a permanent 
discussion of possibilities to form a broad coalition, which would also include the PR that totally controls (taking 
into account such a factor as foreign political influences) both the situation in the region in the social, political 
and economic areas and the process of distributing resources. 
 
This political force, with regard to its cooperation with pro-Russian forces at the level of the ARC, continues 
demonstrating its loyalty to the use of myths and stereotypes towards ethnic communities in this multi-ethnic 
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region, which erodes the stability and predictability of the socio-political situation in Crimea and, thus, might 
produce various negative consequences. In this aspect, problems of ethnic communities are not properly 
solved, which evokes frustration of the very Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians living o¬n the peninsula. 
 
Hence, notwithstanding the autonomy’s “uncontroversial territory”, the objective of society and power is to 
make this region of Ukraine totally different from the “Achilles’ heel” of the country as Crimea is often referred 
to. To this end, it is necessary to get rid of general Ukrainian trends, at least, one of them – the conversion of 
power into business and resources.
